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META-INSTITUTIONAL CONCEPTS: 
A NEW CATEGORY FOR SOCIAL ONTOLOGY1
Abstract
In Speech Acts, John Searle argues that institutional facts presuppose, for their existence, 
the existence of certain institutions (understood as systems of constitutive rules). In this 
paper I extend Searle’s theory of institutional facts arguing that a further level is needed 
for the investigation of the structure of institutional reality: the level of meta-institutional 
concepts. The meta-institutional concepts are concepts that go beyond (Greek: metá) the 
institutions of which they are conditions of possibility. An example of meta-institutional 
concept is the concept of game. In a culture which does not have the concept of game, 
we could move the chess-men according to the rules of chess, we could also perform a 
castling, but it would be impossible to play chess.
It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unac-
quainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves 
of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate mental accompa-
niments. And if we were to see it we should say they were playing chess.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1953, I, § 200
1. Introduction: meta-institutional concepts
1.1. In his book Mind, Language and Society. Philosophy in the Real World, John 
Searle defines institutional facts as facts the nature (type) of which is constituted 
by rules; for this reason he calls them “constitutive rules”2. As stated by Searle, 
1 This paper is dedicated to the memory of Hubert Schwyzer (Vienna, Austria, 1935-Santa 
Barbara, California, United States, 2006).
2 Cfr. Searle 1965: 223-225, Searle 1969: 33-34.
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1.2. The present paper is divided in three parts. In the first part, analysing the 
fact that Kasparov won at chess (fact (i)), I show that this institutional fact is 
not completely constituted by the rules of chess, because for it to be possible (in 
the society where it happens), the concept of victory must exist, a concept that 
is not constituted, but, much rather, presupposed by the rules of chess. In this 
part, I argue that the concept of victory is a meta-institutional concept common 
to other competitive games9. 
In the second part, I analyse the fact that Kasparov is playing chess (fact (ii)) 
and I show that, much as the fact that Kasparov won at chess, also the nature 
of this institutional fact (that Kasparov is playing chess) is not entirely created 
by the rules of chess. In order for it to be possible to play chess, the concept of 
competitive game is needed. Here I argue that the concept of competitive game, 
too, is an example of a meta-institutional concept.
In the third part, in the light of the discovery of meta-institutional concepts, I 
point out that the structure of institutional reality is more complex than it appears 
in Searle’s social ontology. Searle’s social ontology needs to be extended. I agree 
with Searle that institutional facts presuppose, for their existence, the existence 
of institutions, but I add that some institutions, in their turn, presuppose, for 
their existence, the existence of certain meta-institutional concepts. I believe 
that, beyond the level of institutional facts and the level of institutions, a third 
level is needed for the investigation of the structure of institutional reality: the 
level of meta-institutional concepts.
Let us now analyse in detail the two facts:
(i) Kasparov won at chess,
(ii) Kasparov is playing chess.
2. Victory as a meta-institutional concept
2.1. I start from the first fact: Kasparov won at chess. The fact that Kasparov 
won at chess is certainly an institutional fact. As Searle argues, victory and defeat 
in games are instances of institutional facts10. Indeed, victory in a game like chess 
presupposes the existence of the institution of chess. Evidently you cannot win 
a chess game, if the institution of the game of chess does not exist.
Nonetheless the fact that:
Kasparov won at chess,
9 Żełaniec 2013: 153 ff. has urged that the concept of victory-in-a-game, though logically su-
perordinate to the specific concepts of victory in a specific game, is not bouletically autonomous 
or independent with respect to these, that is, it is psychologically impossible to will a victory-in-
a-game without willing a victory in a specific game.
10 Searle 1995: 28, 101.
constitutive rules «not only regulate, but also constitute, or make possible, the 
form of activity that they regulate. The classic example is the rules of chess»3.
For the kind of constitutive rules which constitute the concept (the eidos) of 
their object, Amedeo Giovanni Conte proposed the name “eidetic-constitutive 
rules”. According to Conte:
The eidetic-constitutive rules are those that determine the connotation of those terms 
that (in the formulation of the rules) designate the praxemes (the units of praxis) which are 
governed by the rules. For example the rules of chess are eidetic-constitutive because (and in 
the sense that) they determine the connotation of terms (“bishop”, “castling”, “check”, …) 
which designate the praxemes (pieces, pragmemes4, game situations) of the game5.
The idea that there are rules which create new types of acts and new possibilities 
of action can also be found in the work of the Polish legal philosopher Czesław 
Znamierowski Podstawowe pojęcia teorji prawa (The Fundamental Concepts of the 
Theory of Law) published in 19246.
According to Searle, «the very possibility of playing chess depends on there 
being rules of chess». Nonetheless, if we consider the following two facts:
(i) Kasparov won at chess,
(ii) Kasparov is playing chess,
we can see that the situation is somewhat more complex, in the sense that that 
very possibility does not depend exclusively on constitutive rules.
In fact the nature of these two facts seems not to be completely constituted 
by constitutive rules.
These two facts, (i) and (ii), presuppose, for their existence, not only the ex-
istence of systems of constitutive rules, but also the existence of certain concepts 
(or semantic structures) that I call “meta-institutional concepts”. The meta-in-
stitutional concepts are concepts that are conditions of possibility of institutions 
(and therefore of institutional facts)7. The phrase “meta-institutional concepts” 
refers to the fact that the meta-institutional concepts go beyond (Greek: μετά 
metá) the institutions of which they are conditions of possibility8.
3 Searle 1999: 123. For a reconstruction of the heterogeneous philosophies of constitutive rules, 
cfr. Żełaniec 2013.
4 Conte calls “pragmemes” the acts whose type is constituted by eidetic-constitutive rules. A 
castling in chess e.g. is a pragmeme.
5 Conte 1988: 252.
6 See e.g. Żełaniec 2013: 35-37, Lorini and Żełaniec 2013.
7 Following Searle, by the term “institution” I mean a system of constitutive rules. Cfr. Searle 
1969: 51, Searle 2010: 10.
8 I owe the phrase “meta-institutional concepts” to Miller 1981. Cfr. Lorini, 2000: 311-313, 
Roversi 2012: 143-144.
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Here Wittgenstein seems to allude to the fact that winning in a game does 
not coincide with the winning position that determines the victory14. For ex-
ample, the configuration of chess pieces on a chessboard determines the victory 
of a player, but victory is not a mere game-interior state of affairs consisting in a 
configuration of chess pieces on a chessboard. There is something more and it is 
in this “something more” that there is the flavour of victory. Victory is something 
more than a simple game situation (for example: the checkmate) that produces it.
2.3. As I have shown before, the concept of victory is not an institutional con-
cept of the chess, but a meta-institutional concept of this institution or perhaps of 
a range of similar institutions. The concept of victory, indeed, is a condition of 
possibility of certain institutions like the games of soccer (association football) 
and chess. It is logically prior to these institutions.
Unlike the institutional concepts of checkmate, the concept of victory does 
not have its own condition of possibility in the institution of game of chess, 
i.e. in the rules of chess. On the contrary, it is the concept of victory itself that 
constitutes a necessary condition of possibility of certain institutions such as 
competitive games.
You cannot play chess without having the concept of victory. Moreover, it is 
impossible to construct by rules an institution like the game of chess without 
presupposing the concept of victory.
Unlike the concept of checkmate, the concept of victory is not constituted, 
but presupposed by the rules of chess. In particular, it is presupposed by Article 
10.1 of the F.I.D.E. Laws of Chess:
The game is won by the player who has checkmated his opponent’s king.
2.4. Besides, a characteristic of the meta-institutionality of the concepts of 
victory and defeat is their trans-institutionality. Whereas the conditions of victory 
and defeat change as we shift from one game to another, the meaning of “vic-
tory” and the meaning of “defeat” remain unchanged. Unlike the concept of 
checkmate or the soccer concept of goal, the concept of victory is a concept 
common to all competitive games15.
3. Game as a meta-institutional concept
3.1. In the first part of this paper, I analysed the fact that Kasparov won at 
chess. Now I shall examine the second of two above-mentioned facts: Kasparov 
is playing chess.
14 As Dummett 1978: 8 writes, «to say for each particular game what winning it consists in is 
not to give a satisfactory account of the concept of winning a game».
15 On the victory as essential element of competitive games, cfr. Huizinga 1938, Caillois 1958.
is structurally different from another institutional fact such as the fact that:
Kasparov has checkmated his opponent’s king.
It is important to note that the two sentences “Kasparov won at chess” and 
“Kasparov has checkmated his opponent’s king” could be used to describe 
correctly the same fact, but obviously in a different ways, grasping different 
elements of the same fact.
So we can ask: what is the difference between these two institutional facts? I 
argue that the fact that Kasparov has checkmated his opponent’s king is a fact 
the nature of which is entirely constituted by rules of chess, while the fact that 
Kasparov won at chess is a fact that presupposes the rules of chess, but the nature 
of which is not completely constituted by these rules.
The concept of victory, indeed, unlike the concept of checkmate, is not a 
concept constituted by the rules of chess11. So we can say that the concept of 
victory, unlike the concept of checkmate, is not an institutional concept of chess12.
2.2. While winning at chess is an institutional fact, the concept of victory is 
not an institutional concept of the institution of chess. Indeed, the concept of 
victory, unlike the concept of checkmate, is not a concept constituted by the rules 
of chess. There are no rules of chess that define what victory is in itself, although 
there are rules of chess defining what constitutes victory in chess.
Unlike the meaning of “checkmate”, the meanings of “victory” and “defeat” 
go beyond the boundaries of the single institution of chess and indeed of any 
other institution. Indeed, in an institution like the game of chess there are rules 
which determine the conditions of victory and defeat, and therefore determine 
the extension of the words “victory” and “defeat” in the sphere of the institution 
of chess. In other words, there are rules determining the conditions of victory 
and defeat in a chess match: they determine which configurations of chess pieces 
on the chessboard constitute the victory in a chess match.
But the intension of the two words “victory” and “defeat” is not determined 
by the institution that determines the conditions of victory and defeat (unlike 
the word “checkmate” the intension of which is entirely constituted by the rules 
of chess).
On this topic, very interesting is what Ludwig Wittgenstein writes in Philo-
sophical Grammar, where he asks himself: «What constitutes winning and losing 
in a game […]?» And he answers: «It isn’t of course just the winning position»13.
11 A similar thesis appears in Raz 1975: 121. Raz argues that victory is a value of the game of 
chess, which is not constituted by the rules of the game.
12 According to Smith 2003b: 298, the concepts of winning and losing are «basic institutional 
concepts», «institutional concepts not capable of being further defined on the institutional level». 
On basic institutional concepts, cfr. also Smith 1990: 55.
13 Wittgenstein 1974: 293.
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Chess is not a duel or a battle. It is a sacred rite. There is no winning or losing at all19.
3.2. At this point the misunderstanding is revealed: in Ruritania, chess is not 
a game, but a religious rite that is enacted only once a year by the priests of the 
community20. The rite of chess is not a form of competition: in the rite of chess, 
you cannot win or lose, because victory and defeat are no part of the grammar 
of the rite. Consequently, for the grammar of rite, in Ruritania’s chess it does 
not make sense to talk of strategy21.
In this thought experiment, Schwyzer focuses on the fact that the differences 
between the game of chess and the rite of chess are not determined by, and not 
pindownable to, the constitutive rules of chess. Indeed, the activity of the two 
practices (rite of chess and game of chess) is governed by the same rules: the 
constitutive rules of chess.
For our purposes, it is important to point out that Ruritanians (as the tribe 
described by Wittgenstein [1953]) are not acquainted with competitive games. 
As Schwyzer tells us, Ruritanians do not know games as tennis, football or chess:
The only kinds of playing they recognize are (a) “intransitive” playing, or playing 
simpliciter, as in, e.g., “Go and play in the garden, with Johnny, with this ball”; and (b) 
playing at something (like playing teacher, or soldiers, or cowboys and Indians, mother 
and father). […] There is no playing that is eo ipso competitive: there are no games like 
tennis, football, or chess22.
For the activity of playing chess to be possible, (the existence of ) a second 
cultural element, besides the constitutive rules of chess, is needed: the concept 
of competitive game.
In a society where the concept of competitive game does not exist, we could 
move the chess-men according to the rules of chess, we could also perform a 
castling, but it would be impossible to play chess: in a society like that, it would 
be impossible to engage in any activity of the nature of a competitive game.
An epistemological thesis corresponds to this ontological thesis about the 
nature of an institutional activity such as playing chess: if you do not understand 
what games are (i.e. if you do not have the concept of game), you cannot un-
derstand what a chess match is, although you know very well the rules of chess.
19 Ibidem. Cf. Borutti 1983: 108-110.
20 A similar case is described by Lévi-Strauss 1962: 44. He describes the case of Gahuku-Gama 
people from New Guinea «qui ont appris le football, mais qui jouent, plusieurs jours de suite, 
autant de parties qu’il est nécessaire pour que s’équilibrent exactement celles perdues et celles 
gagnées par chaque camp». They consider «un jeu comme un rite».
21 An interesting rule-constituted practice very similar to the rite of chess is the practice of the 
consulting the poison oracle among the Azande. Cfr. Ahern 1982.
22 Schwyzer 1969: 457.
The fact that Kasparov is playing chess, too, is an institutional fact, since it is 
not possible to play chess without the constitutive rules of chess. But the rules of 
chess are not a sufficient condition of possibility of playing chess. The idea that 
the rules of chess do not constitute the game character of such an institutional 
activity is suggested by a thought experiment by Hubert Schwyzer.
Imagine the following. I have now been in Ruritania some time, and can speak the 
language tolerably well. One day I accompany my host with his family to a certain 
building, where a large number of people are sitting in a circle on the floor, murmuring 
among themselves agitatedly. In the center of the circle is a small table with two chairs, 
and on the table is a chessboard with chessmen arranged as for the beginning of a game. 
After a while, two men in elaborate clothes enter the room and seat themselves at opposite 
sides of the table; whereupon those sitting on the floor fall silent and watch intently. The 
men at the table then proceed, with what appears to be an air of great concentration, to 
move the chess pieces around on the board according to the rules of chess. It strikes me, 
however, that they play a rather wild game, and I can see no consistent strategy in the 
moves of either player. The excitement mounts until, after an hour or so, white mates 
black. Then everyone present, including both men at the table, shows signs of extreme 
relief; they mop their brows, smile and congratulate one another16.
Continuing with his thought experiment, Schwyzer imagines that, on return-
ing home, he shows his own chess set to his host and he asks him to play chess. 
But here is the surprising reaction of his host to this request:
He turns pale, is horrified and appalled, and insists that I put it away immediately. 
“Blasphemer!” he exclaims. “Did you want to play at chess with me? And did you forge 
that chess set?”17.
Why did Schwyzer’s host react in this way to the simple request to play chess? 
Schwyzer understands the reason of such unexpected reaction when his host 
explains to him what the practice of chess consists of in Ruritania:
There is, he says, only one chess set for each community. Chess is enacted once every 
year by the priest of the community, for purposes of determining the will of the gods. 
If white mates black, the community and the crops will flourish; if black mates white, 
there will be trouble18.
Then, to Schwyzer’s question whether the white should always win, the host, 
even more shocked, responds in this way: 
16 Schwyzer 1969: 456.
17 Ibidem.
18 Ivi: 457.
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As Gaetano Carcaterra points out in the book La forza costitutiva delle norme 
(The Constitutive Force of Norms), the power of decreeing is not absolute even 
in the spiritual world:
Even the creation of a game has to comply with the requirements of game activity in 
general. […] Also the power of cultural creation is subject to certain conditions and 
meets with limits24.
The obstacles encountered by the power of creation lie in the “nature” of the 
object that is created. For instance, in order to create a game practice, you must 
respect the conditions which are set by the concept of game itself. There is a 
certain “resistance of the concept” (“eidetic resistance”), which conditions the 
power of cultural creation.
In particular, this kind of constraints exists for competitive games (chess, 
football, tennis, bridge). For example, in a competitive game “it must be 
possible to win” and “it must be possible to lose”. In the language of German 
phenomenologist Adolf Reinach, these are two eidetic laws (Wesensgesetze) of 
the competitive game. This is the reason why the advertising that I once saw on 
an Irish road “Who plays wins” sounds odd.
4. Two different levels of conditions of possibility of institutional facts
4.1. In the first two parts of this paper, I argued that the concept of victory 
and the concept of competitive game are a particular kind of concepts that play 
an important role in the institutional reality: they make possible the existence 
of the certain institutions (as the game of chess) and then of institutional facts 
relative to these institutions. For example, without the concept of victory and 
the concept of competitive game, obviously you can move in conformity to the 
rules of chess, you can also perform a castling, but you cannot play chess at all, 
as Schwyzer’s thought experiment shows25.
But what is the significance of the discovery of this new kind of concepts for 
social ontology?
To answer this question, I would like to start from John Searle’s social ontology. 
His social ontology is basically an answer to a fundamental question asked by 
Searle: «How are institutional facts possible?»26. In other words, as Searle writes, 
«how to get from electrons to elections and from protons to president?»27; how 
is it possible in a universe consisting entirely of physical particles in fields of 
force that there can be such things like European citizens, the President of Ital-
24 Carcaterra 1979: 109.
25 Lorini 2012b.
26 Searle 1995: 2.
27 Searle 2010: 3.
A similar kind of impossibility is described in a short story by Jorge Luis Borges: 
La busca de Averroes (The Averroës Investigation). In this short story, Borges tells 
us of an impossible quest, the quest of Averroës – a quest for Arabic words for 
“tragedy” and “comedy”. Averroës tried to translate the Aristotle’s Poetics, but 
being closed within the limits of Islamic culture, and not knowing theatre, he 
could not understand the meaning of the two terms “tragedy” and “comedy”.
3.3. Whereas the fact of playing chess is an institutional fact, the concept 
of game (the concept of competitive game) is not an institutional concept of 
the game of chess, since it is not constituted by rules of chess. It is logically 
independent from these rules.
For this feature, we have to differentiate between the concept of game and 
institutional concepts (rule-constituted concepts), such as the concepts of castling 
and checkmate.
In relation to the institution of chess, the concept of game is not an institu-
tional concept: it is a meta-institutional concept. With regard to the institution 
of the game of chess, the concept of game is meta-institutional, since it is not 
constituted, but presupposed by the rules of chess.
Therefore, the concept of game is a (necessary) condition of possibility of 
both the activity of playing chess (an institutional fact) and the game of chess (an 
institution).
That the concept of game is presupposed by rules of chess, is made evident 
by an analysis of the Laws of Chess. The meta-institutional concept of game is 
presupposed, for example, by Article 1 of the F.I.D.E. Laws of Chess:
The game of chess is played between two opponents by moving pieces on a square 
board called a “chessboard”.
This rule presupposes that chess is a game. The word “played” refers to the 
concept of game, without which this word is meaningless.
3.4. As a meta-institutional concept, the concept of game acts as a condition 
of possibility as well as a boundary of the norm-giving activity of an imaginary 
inventor of a new game.
For the inventor of a new game, the concept of game is a limit of his/her 
power of cultural creation: in the creation of a game, the imaginary inventor 
must respect the constitutive game character of the game23.
23 The criterion of inventability is introduced by Crosby 1990: 74 to distinguish, in the insti-
tutional world, between “things of convention” and “essential structures”. According to Crosby, 
the fundamental difference between an essential structure and a thing of convention is that while 
a conventional entity is inventable and modifiable, an essential structure is “uninventable” e 
“unchangeable”.
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competitive game, if you live in a society like Ruritania’s, that does not have the 
concepts of victory and competitive game.
Moreover, the investigation of meta-institutional concepts reveals another im-
portant truth on the ontology of institutions: institutions are not self-contained; 
they are not a complete and independent unit in itself. They are not self-sufficient 
from the point of view of their categorical apparatus. Institutions are immersed 
in a conceptual atmosphere that conditions their possibility of existence30.
In the light of these last considerations on the conditions of possibility of the 
institutions, we can enrich the Searle’s two-level picture of the structure of in-
stitutional reality with a new level: a level of meta-institutional concepts:
meta-institutional concepts
↓
institution
↓
institutional facts
This three-level picture of the structure of institutional reality has the advantage 
of highlighting two facts:
(i) institutions are not self-contained,
(ii) there are at least two different levels of conditions of possibility of institutional 
facts: the level of institutions and the level of meta-institutional concepts.
30 Another aspect of institutions that reveals that institutions are not self-contained is relative to 
the τέλος (the aim, the end, the goal, the purpose) of an institution. As Żełaniec 2007: 40 states, 
institutions are not autotelic, they have not a purpose in and not apart from itself. They must 
have an anthropological significance.
ian Republic, the Juventus soccer team, five euro bills, property rights, English 
sentences, chess games, tribunals, contracts, political parties, elections?
An answer to this question is already to be found in Searle (1969). Searle argues 
that institutional facts are made possible by the human institutions understood 
as systems of constitutive rules. As Searle writes about institutional facts:
They are indeed facts; but their existence, unlike the existence of brute facts, presup-
poses the existence of certain human institutions28.
For example, it is impossible to score a goal (in a soccer game), in the absence 
of the institution of the game of soccer with its rules. Similarly, you cannot owe 
a car in the absence of the institution of property, although you can still drive it.
So this is the picture of the structure of institutional reality that Searle draws; 
it is a two-level picture:
institution
↓
institutional facts
4.2. I believe that it could be interesting to examine a further level of in-
stitutional reality that Searle’s social ontology leaves out. It is the level of the 
conditions of possibility of the institutions themselves. As I said, Searle asked 
the question: «How are institutional facts possible?»29. I would like to ask a 
different question: «How are institutions possible?».
To answer this second question, I think we have to investigate what I have 
called «meta-institutional concepts», i.e. the concepts, presupposed by certain 
institutions, that go beyond the institutions of which they are conditions of 
possibility. It is only the investigation of meta-institutional concepts presupposed 
by a certain institution that allows to have a complete picture of the conditions 
of possibility of the institutional facts made possible by this institution.
According to Searle, to understand how it is possible to score a goal in a soccer 
game, it is necessary to investigate the institution of soccer and its constitutive 
rules, but, I think, it is necessary to examine also the conditions of possibility of 
the same institution of soccer and its constitutive rules. At this level, the concept 
of competitive game and the concept of victory come into play.
For example, as I showed in the first part and in the second part of the paper, 
for the existence of institutions such as the game of chess, the concepts of victory 
and of competitive game are needed. Besides, it is impossible to invent a new 
28 Searle 1969: 51.
29 Searle 1995: 2.
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